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570 PEOPLE v. FRIEND [50 0.2d 
[Crim. No. 6146. In Bank. June 30, 1958.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. WILBERT FEJ_.Ix FRIEND, 
Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Province of Court and Jury-Comment on Evi-
dence.-Under Const., art. VI, § 19, providing that the court 
may make such "comment" on the evidence and the testimony 
and credibility of any witness as in its opinion is necessary for 
proper determination of the case, a trial judge is empowered 
to do more than merely summarize the evidence; he may 
analyze the testimony critically, giving his opinions for the 
guidance of the jury. 
[2] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Comment on Evidence.-The 
purpose of the 1934 amendment of Const., art. VI, § 19, is to 
enable the trial judge to comment to the jury on the facts of 
the case, to give the jurors his analysis of the evidence and to 
express his opinion on the merits of the case, informing them 
at the same time that his views are merely advisory. 
[3] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Comment on Evidence.-In 
approving the 1934 amendment of Const., art. VI, § 19, the in-
tent of the voters was to make the judge a real factor in the 
administration of justice rather than a mere referee, and to 
remove the prior prohibition against his power to comment. 
[4] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Comment on Evidence.-A 
trial judge is not "rigorously prohibited" from action or words 
having the effect of conveying to the jury his personal opinion 
as to the truth or falsity of any evidence. (Disapproving state-
ment to the contrary in People v. O'Donnell, 11 Cal.2d 666, 671 
[81 P.2d 939].) 
[5] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Comment on Evidence.-A 
judge's power to comment on the evidence is not unlimited; 
he may not withdraw material evidence from the jury's con-
sideration or distort the testimony, and his comments should 
be temperately and fairly made, rather than argumentative 
or contentious to a degree amounting to partisan advocacy; 
the jury must remain the exclusive arbiter of questions of fact 
and credibility of witnesses, and the judge should make clear 
that his views are not binding but advisory only. 
[6a, 6b] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Comment on Evidence. 
-A judge may restrict his comments to portions of the evi-
dence or to the credibility of a single witness and need not 
sum up all the testimony, both favorable and unfavorable. 
[1] See Am.Jur., Trial, § 82. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-4] Criminal Law, § 675.1(2); [5-7] 
Criminal Law, ~ 675.1(4); [8-11] Criminal Law, § 675.1(7). 
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(Disapproving any stat<:>ments to the contrary in People v. 
Hoope1·, 92 Cal.App.2d .'524, 531 [207 P.2d 117]; 1'eople v. 
Mason, 72 Cal.App.2d 6!J9, 711 [165 P.2d 481]; and People v. 
TalkinJton, 8 Cal.App.2d 75, 99 [47 P.2d 368].) 
[7] !d.-Province of Court and ,Tury-Comment on Evidence.-
There is no justification for holding that a judge has a lesser 
right to comment on the evidence where punishment is involved 
than where matters relating to guilt are in issue, and the same 
principles should be applied in determining whether the power 
has been properly exercised. 
[8] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Comment on Evidence.-The 
judge in commenting on the evidence in a murder case complied 
with the requirement that his comments were not binding on 
them where he pointed out that the jurors were free to reject 
anything which did not coincide with their views, that they 
were the '·judges of the evidence," that it was up to them to 
decide what was to be done with defendant, and that "The 
penalty is entirely up to you and let the evidence and your 
conscience be your guide." 
[9] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Comment on Evidence.-
The judge's comment on the evidence in a murder case that 
defendant had on two occasions refused to answer questions 
"relative to the rape and relative to the molesting of the 
minor children several years later and the rape on the elderly 
woman," and that defendant was ordered to answer by the 
court and said, "I don't remember" or "I don't know," was in-
accurate where the record disclosed that the first of these 
questons pertained to the location of defendant's suitcases at 
about the time of a telephone conversation with his probation 
officer (to which defendant replied that he did not recall), 
and that the second referred to whether defendant went to a 
certain park on the night of the murder (to which he replied, 
"I think I did"), but constituted no more than a minor in-
accuracy which could not have prejudiced defendant. 
[10] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Comment on Evidence.-
It was not error for the judge to make the comment in a murder 
case that "It is up to you [the jury] to determine whether 
[defendant] showed any remorse or whether he has told you 
everything from the witness stand that he knew," where it 
was preceded by the direction that the jury "may consider" 
whether defendant had any remorse and was followed by the 
remark that "you may take all those things into consideration." 
[11] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Comment on Evidence.-
The judge's comments in a murder case were not limited to 
evidence unfavorable to defendant where the judge pointed 
out that defendant had made a confession, that he had under-
gone an orchidectomy, that the jury could consider his his-
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tory after the operation, and that it did not appear that he 
had been in any serious trouble since then, and where no refer-
ence was made to the testimony of defendant's sister-in-law 
that defendant, following a telt>phone conversation with his 
probation officer, had said, "Well, murder will out," mentioned 
the existence of a warrant, and stated that he thought he would 
take his suitcases and "start traveling." 
APPEAL (automatirally taken under Prn. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b)) from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County and from an order denying a new trial. John A. 
Hewieker, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment imposing the death 
penalty, after retrial to determine punishment, affirmed. 
John R. Sorbo, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and William E. 
James, Deputy Attorney General, for Rl"spondent. 
GIBSON, C. J.-Defendant previously appealed from a 
judgment whirh imposed the dt>ath penalty in accordance with 
a jury verdict. We upheld his conviction of murder of the 
first degree, but, because of errors relating to the issue of 
punishment, we remanded the cause for the sole purpose of 
redetermining that issue. (People v. Friend, 47 Cal.2d 749, 
772 [306 P.2d 463] .) On retrial, the jury fixed the penalty at 
death, and the case is again before us automatically. (Pen. 
Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) The only question presented is 
whether defendant was deprived of a fair trial by the judge's 
comments on the evidence. 
One morning in 1936, Ruth Muir's body was found on the 
beach in La Jolla about a block from the home of her parents. 
Her face was covered with blood, and a bench leg which had 
been used as a club lay nearby. An autopsy surgeon discov-
ered numerous bruises, abrasions and lacerations on the body 
and head and determint'd that death had been caused by frac-
ture of the skull and multiple injuries. Defendant was living 
in a tent on the beach, and, when the police questioned him, 
he denied knowing anything about the killing and was re-
leased. 'l'he crime remained unsolved until 1955, when defend-
ant, an ex-convict who was 44 years of age, confessed to having 
committed it. 
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In the five years following the killing, defendant was con-
victed of burglary, contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor, 1 and rape. In connection with his conviction of rape, 
defendant was placed on probation for 25 yrars on condition 
that he serve six month:;; in jail and undergo an orchidectomy. 
This operation was performed in 1941. Thereafter, until J 955, 
defendant's record was clear '>l'ith the exception of a $20 fine 
for stealing a relative's dog in 1946 and an arrest in 1952 for 
causing a disturbance while drunk in a bar. 
In 1955 defrndant went to Detroit for two months in vio-
lation of the terms of his probation. About a week after he 
returned to California, his probation officer telephonrd him. 
arranged to meet him in a few days, and told him that he had 
violated his probation and that there was a warrant for his 
arrest. According to defendant's sister-in-law, when he hung 
up the telephone, he said, "\Veil, murdrr will out," mentioned 
the existence of a warrant, and statrd that he thought that 
he would take his suitcase>; and "start traveling." The fol-
lowing evening, after spending srveral hours in a bar, defend-
ant telephonrd a newspaper reporter and said that he had 
killed Miss Muir. The record does not disclose the other 
circumstances leading to defendant's arrest. 
Upon being taken into custody, defendant told the police 
that he had committrd the crime but that he had not molested 
the victim or taken any valuables from her. In subsrquent 
interviews he stated that he had been drinl<ing and had lost 
his money playing pool and that, about !J or 10 p. m., he went 
to the beach looking for someone to rob because he wanted 
money to buy more drinks. After removing a leg from a picnic 
bench to use as a club, he saw a woman who was seated facing 
the ocean, walked up behind her, and struck her a heavy blow 
on the head, knocking her to the ground. He then dragged 
her to a nearby gully, ·where he struc·k her sevrral times about 
the faee with his fists. He cut the laces of her corset with a 
knife and raped her, or tried to rape her. In explanation of 
his delay of 19 years in confessing the crime, he said that he 
wished to ayoid hurting his parents and his wife, who were 
now dead. 
Defendant did not take the witness stand at the first trial. 
At the second trial he testified that he had not been troubled 
by an exerssive srx urge after undergoing the orchidectomy. 
"Defendant was charged with misconduct of a sexual nature with two 
little girls and pleaded guilty to one count of contributing to the delin-
quency of a minor. 
574 PEOPLE v. FRIEND [50 C.2d 
He denied that, when he received the telephone call from his 
probation officer, he made the statements which his sister-in-
law attributed to him or that he confessed b<'cause he thought 
the arrest warrant mentioned by the officer related to the 
killing. According to defendant, he decided to confess two 
weeks earlier in Detroit. He testified, ''One reason I was tired, 
that is why I turned myself in. Seemed like I was running 
all these years, trying to get something settled in my mind. 
That was one way, to come ont with the truth, because I had 
read once or t-wice in the Bible where the truth would set you 
free, and after I confessed to this last, this murder, this error 
in my life, well, I was free in my mind, although not in my 
body .... It seemed to me th<'re was only one way out and 
that was to tell the truth about it. At least you can't go 
wrong by telling the truth. I could see that. I can't see 
where I have lost anything by telling the truth, although I did 
sit up there close to the gas chamber for eighteen or ninetf'en 
months. 'l'hat kind of opened my eyes up to what I had 
done.'' 
Before giving formal instructions to the jury, the trial 
judge made the following remarks: ''Under the law, ladies 
and gentlemen of the jury, and under the Constitution, I am 
entitled to comment on the evidence in this cast'. I am going to 
make a few comments and tell you certain things you can 
consider, and, of course, anything I say is not binding on 
you; you can disregard it. I will just point out various things 
and if it coincides with your views, accept it; if it doesn't, why 
reject it. 
"The argument of counsel in this case is not evidence. 
Neither is anything I tell you evidence in this case. Of 
course, both sides in this case put forward their best foot 
to try to get you to see their side of the case. Now you have 
heard all the evidence. You are the judges of the evidence 
and it is up to you to decide what should be done with the 
defendant in this case. 
"Now, of course, this was a brutal murder. You heard 
all the faets, the testimony here of the People, and the defend-
ant took the witness stand. Now it is true that he called the 
newspapers and said he had committed this crime. He did 
say that the second time he called the newspapers he had no 
recollection of his eall. How intoxicatrd he was the night he 
called the newspaper I do not know. 
"You saw the def('ndant on the witness stand on two differ-
cut occasions when he wouldn't answer the questions on cross-
June195SJ PEOPLE v. FRIE:N'D 
[50 C.2d 570: 327 P.2d 971 
575 
examination. Now it has been stated here he made a con-
fession. When certain questions were asked him why he 
didn't want to answer them. When I ordered him to answer 
them he said, 'I don't remember,' or 'I don't know.' Those 
were questions relative to the rape and relative to the molest-
ing of the minor children several years later and the rape on 
the elderly woman on which he was on probation at the time 
he was picked up for this offense. 
"Now you can consider, of course, the various items of his 
confession, his history throughout his life, both before and 
after this event here, the fact that he had this operation. Now 
it has been said he wasn't in auy trouble since the operation, 
no serious trouble. Well, when we put people on probation-
he was on 25 years probation-we expect them to comply with 
the law and if they violate it in any serious degree probation 
is revoked and the defendant is sentenced to the State Prison 
or County Jail, depending upon the character of the offense. 
Probation is a deterrent; at least I have always considered 
it such. You put a man on probation and you figure he is 
going to behave himself to a certain extent. Whether or not 
his behavior was the result of being on probation or the result 
of the operation, or a combination of both, is up to you to 
determine. 
"You saw the defendant on the stand. You may consider 
whether he had any remorse for this crime. I heard his testi-
mony. I seemed to feel as I heard it that Mr. Friend was 
concerned mostly about his own plight and not what he had 
done. He didn't want to go to Capistrano on the day he went 
up there, according to his own statements. He made the 
statement that the dead would take care of themselves.2 So I 
suppose they do. But that was his statement. It is up to you 
to determine whether he showed any remorse or whether he 
has told you everything from the witness stand that he knew. 
"He was the only one there at the scene that survived and 
the only one that could give you the full details, if he saw 
fit so to do, but he said he didn't remember much about the 
rape, didn't remember much about this or about that. 
"Now you may take all those things into consideration. As 
,This eomment apparently refers to testimony by defendant that on 
the day following the telephone eall from his probation officer he agreed 
to go with his brother and sister-in-law to decorate his mother's grave, 
although he did not want to go, and at that time stated that he "kind 
of more or less believed that when a person was buried you forget about 
them, let the dead take eare of the dead .•.. " 
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I said, the penalty is entirely up to you and let the evidence 
and your conscience be your guide.'' 
The question to be determined is whether the judge exceeded 
his authority in making the foregoing comments. 
Section 19 of article VI of the Constitution, as amended in 
1934, provides : ''The court ... may make such comment on 
the evidence and the testimony and credibility of any witnes:s 
as in its opinion is necessary for the proper determination of 
the case. The court shall inform the jury in all cases that 
the jurors are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact 
submitted to them and of the credibility of the witnesses.'' 
Similar provisions are contained in statutes. (Pen. Code, 
§ 1093, subd. 6, § 1127.) 
[1] It seems clear from the use of the word "comment" 
in section 19 of article VI that a trial judge is empowered to 
do more than merely summarize the evidence and that he 
may analyze the testimony critically, giving his opinions for 
the guidance of the jury.3 If there can be any doubt in this 
respect, it is put to rest by resort to the history of the section 
and to the decisions which have considered the scope of the 
power conferred. 
[2] Prior to its amendment in 1934, section 19 of article 
VI provided that a judge could ''state the testimony,'' as 
well as declare the law, so that the change in language would 
be meaningless if viewed as permitting only such action. The 
purpose of the amendment is disclosed by the ballot argument 
in its favor, which stated, "This measure ... enables the trial 
judge to comment to the jury on the facts of the case; to 
give the jurors his analysis of the evidence and to express his 
opinion on the merits of the case, but informing them at the 
same time, that his views are advisory only .... ''4 
[3] By three cases which this court decided shortly after 
3 The noun "comment" is defined by Webster's New International 
Dictionary, 2d ed. unabridged, 1942, as follows: '' 2. A note or observa· 
tion intended to explain, illustrate, or criticize the meaning of a writing . 
. . . 3. Act or instance of commenting; remark or criticism .... '' 
Further explanation is given in ·webster's Dictionary of Synonyms, 1942, 
p. 695, under the general heading of ''remark,'' where it is said: ''Com· 
ment stresses interpretation, as by bringing out what is not apparent 
or by adding details that heip to clarify .... Very frequently, in modern 
use, the word implies unfavorable interpretation .... Comment applies 
to a remark, or an observation made in criticism, in interpretation, or 
in elucidation of something .... '' 
4It should be noted in this connection that the amendment was sub-
mitted to the voters together with another proposal, which was also 
adopted, namely, an amendment to section 13 of article I giving the 
judge the right to comment on a criminal defendant's failure to testify. 
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it was established that the intent of the voters was to 
make the a real factor in the administration of justice, 
rather than a mere referee, that the constitutional amendment 
removed the prior prohibition against his power to comment, 
and that he is no longer confined to a colorless recital of the 
evidence but may the testimony and express his views 
with respect to its credibility. (People v. De llioss, 4 Cal.2d 
469 P.2d 1031] [upholding the 11arration of circumstances 
tending to militate against the defendant's claim that he loved 
the victim and that the shooting was accidental]; PeoJJle v. 
Ottey, 5 Cal.2d 714 [56 P.2d 193] [upholding, among other 
remarks relating to the defendant's testimony, the commeut 
that "things don't happen that way"]; People v. Gosden, 
6 Cal.2d 14 [56 P.2d 211] [upholding various remarks includ-
ing the judge':; opinion that the defendant's innocent purpose 
in signing the victim's name to an insurance application had 
"not to my mind been satisfactorily explained" and that the 
defendant's explanation for purchasing stryehninc did not 
''appeal to my mind as reasonably consistent with an honest 
mind"].) [4] 'l'here is a statement in People v. O'Donnell, 
11 Cal.2d 666, 671 [ 81 P .2d 939], that a "trial j ndge is rig-
orously prohibited from action or words having the effect of 
conveying to the jury his personal opinion as to the truth or 
falsity of any evidence." The opinion in the 0 'Donnell case 
does not mention section 19 of article VI. The quoted state-
ment, which was made without the dtation of any authority, is 
in co~1flict with the constitutional language expressly author-
izing a judge to comment on "the credibility of any witness," 
and it is disapproved. 
[5] A judge's power to comment on the evidPnre, of 
course, is not unlimited. (People v. Dail, 22 Cal.2c1 642, 658 
[140 P.2d 828] ; People v. Patnbo, 9 Cal.2d 537, 543 171 P.2d 
270, 113 A.L.B.. 1303]; People v. Otteu .• 5 Cal.2d 714, 722 et 
seq. [56 P.2d 193]; People v. Robinson, 73 Cal.App.2d 233, 
237 [166 P.2d 17]; People v. Ramos, 66 Cal.App.2d 731, 735 
[152 P.2d 758]; Kahn v. Commercial Union Fire Ins. Co., 16 
Cal.App.2d 42, 45-47 [ 60 P .2d 177 J.) He may not withdraw 
material evidence from the jury's consideration or distort the 
testimony, and his comments should be temperately and fairly 
made, rather than being argumentative or contentious to a 
degree amounting to partisan advocacy. The jury, as required 
by the constilutional provision, must remain as the exclusive 
arbiter of qucstioM of fact and the credibility of witnesses, 
50 C.2d-19 
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and the should make clear that his views are not binding 
but advisory only. 
The extent to which a is free to comment on the 
evidenec is e;hown by the fact that it has fn'(]_HPntly been 
recognized that a judge may express his opinion as to the guilt 
or innocence of the defendant, so long as the provinee of the 
jury as defined by the constitutional section is not invaded. 
(People v. Rupp, 41 Cal.2d 371, 383 [260 P .2d 1] ; People v. 
Daugherty, 40 Cal.2d 876. 893 [256 P.2d 911]; People v. Dail, 
22 Cal.2d 642, 658-659 [ 140 P .2d 828] ; People v. Warren, 
16 Cal.2d 103, 114 [104 P.2d 1024]; People v. Endy, 12 Cal. 
2d 41, 47 [ 82 P.2d 359] ; People v. Ottey, 5 Cal.2d 714, 729 
[56 P.2d 193]; People v. Yok1lm, 145 Cal.App.2d 245, 258 [302 
P.2d 406] ; People v. Huff, 134 Cal.App.2d 182, 187 [285 
P.2d 17] ; Pomerantz v. Bryan Motors, Inc., 92 Cal.App.2d 
114, 119 [206 P.2d 440]; People v. Busby, 40 Cal.App.2d 193, 
202 [104 P.2d 531].) 5 
[6a] It is also settled that a judge ma.v rrstrict his com-
ments to portions of the evidence or to the credibility of a 
single witness and nt'ed not sum np all the testimony, both 
favorable and unfavorable. (People v. Gosclcn, 6 Cal.2d 14, 
27-28 [56 P.2d 211]; People v. Ottcy, 5 Cal.2d 714, 728 [56 
P.2d 193]; People v. DeMoss, 4 Cal.2d 469, 476-477 [50 P.2d 
1031]; People v. W cllman, 141 Cal.App.2d 101, 106 [296 P.2d 
82] ; People v. Garcia, 124 Cal.App.2d 822, 830 [269 P.2d 
673]; People v. Robinson, 73 Cal.App.2d 233, 238 [166 P.2d 
17]; People v. Keys, 62 Cal.App.2d 903, 914 l145 P.2d 589]; 
People v. King, 30 Cal.App.2d 185, 205 [85 P.2d 928]; see 
People v. Dail, 22 Cal.2d 642, 657-658 [140 P.2d 828] ; People 
v. Ernst, 121 Cal.App.2d 287, 295 [263 P.2d 114] ; Kahn v. 
Commercial Union Fire Ins. Co., 16 Cal.App.2d 42, 47 [60 
P.2d 177].) Any statE'ments to the contrary in Pe.ople v. 
Hooper, 92 Cal.App.2d 524, 531 [207 P.2d 117], People v. 
Mason, 72 Cal.App.2d 699, 711 [165 P.2d 481], and People v. 
Talkington, 8 Cal.App.2d 75, 99 [47 P.2d 368], are dis-
approved. 
5 The cited decisions do not always use the same language to describe 
the limitation on a judge's power to express his opinion regarding guilt 
or innocence. For example, instead of saying, ''so long as the province 
of the .iury as defined by the constitutional section is not invaded,'' some 
courts have used the qualifieation ''in proper eases,'' but it seems clear 
that nothing substantially different is meant. People ''· Ottey, 5 Cal.2d 
714, 729 [GG P.2d 193], which is the leading case on the point, employed 
the phrase, ''so long as the province of the jury as defined by the con-
stitutional section is not invaded,'' and it has usually been cited as 
authority in the subsequent decisions, including those which use different 
aualifvins;r lans;rua~re. 
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Sanguinetti v. Moore Dry Doelc Co., 36 Cal.2d 812 [228 
P.2d 557], did not involve the power to comment on the evi-
dence but the making and granting, in the presence of the 
jury, of a motion to amend the complaint so as to increase the 
prayer for damages. None of the language there used was 
intended to limit the commenting power, as the opinion made 
clear by pointing out that there was no contention that section 
19 of article VI was applicable. (36 Cal.2d at p. 823.) 
[7] There is no justification for holding that a judge has a 
lesser right to comment on the evidence where punishment is 
involved than where matters relating to guilt are in issue, 
and the same principles should be applied in determining 
whether the power has been properly exercised. Section 19 
of article VI n'fers to "the evidence" generally, without set-
ting forth any distinction or qualification as to the issue upon 
which the evidence bears. The evidence of course, impor-
tant in fixing the punishment, and on the prior appeal in this 
case it was pointed out that ''the trend is toward the more 
liberal admission of evidence pertin<:>nt only to the selection 
of penalty." (People v. Friend, 47 CaJ.2d 7 49, 764 [306 
P.2d 463].) Obviously, the judge's analysis of evidence relat-
ing to punishment may be as necessary to assist the jury as 
his remarks on testimony touching upon guilt, so that the 
power to comment promotes the purpose of the constitutional 
amendment as much in one situation as in the other. It is true 
that the jury has exclusive discretion as to the punishment 
to be imposed, but no distinction can be made on this ground 
since the jury is also the exclusive judge of all questions of 
fact relating to guilt. In short, regardless of which issue is 
being tried, the respective functions of judge and jury as to 
factual questions arc the same, and neither the language of 
the constitutional amendmt>nt nor the purpose underlying its 
adoption permits the imposition of different limitations on 
the power to comment on the evidence. 
[8] In the present case the judge fully complied with the 
requirement that the jury be informed that his comments were 
not binding upon them. As we have seen, he pointed out at the 
beginning of his comment that the jurors were free to rejec.t 
anything which did not coincide with their views, that they 
were the "judges of the evidence," and that it was up to them 
to decide what was to be done with defendant. At the con-
elusion of his remarks the judge said, '' 'l'he penalty is entirely 
up to you and let the evidence and your conscience be your 
guide.'' 
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Moreover, in the course of the formal instructions which 
were subsequently given upon the law, the jurors were told: 
"In the penalty, you are entirely free to act according 
to your own judgment. Your discretion in the selection of 
penalty is in no way circumscribrd or limited by law. It is 
an absolute discretion. For examplr, there is no rule of law 
which calls for a sentence of death simply because you find 
that there are no mitigating or extenuating circumstances. 
Similarly, there is no rule of law, which calls for a sentence 
of life imprisonment simply because you find that there are 
no aggravating circumstances.'' The jury was also instructed 
that the choice must be a meaningful one, fundamentally based 
on the evidence, but that weight could be given to ''any con-
sideration whatever" which in the light of the evidence seemed 
important to the jury, and the judge, stressing that he was 
uot attempting to indicate all of the matters which might be 
taken into account, listed examples of what might be consid-
ered, including many of the factors mentioned in People v. 
Friend, 47 Cal.2d 749, 768 [306 P.2d 463]. These instructions 
sufficiently set forth the principles declared on the earlier ap-
peal, and no claim is made that any of them was incorrect. 
[9] It is urged that the judge misstated the evidence in 
the comment to the effect that defendant had on two occasions 
refused to answer questions ''relative to the rape and relative 
to the molesting of the minor children several years later and 
the rape on the elderly woman" and that defendant was 
ordered to answer by the court and said, "I don't remember" 
or ''I don't know.'' The record discloses that the two ques-
tions which the court directed defendant to answer did not 
relate to rape or to molestation of children. The first of the 
two questions pertained to the location of two of defendant's 
suitcases at about the time of the telephone conversation with 
his probation officer, aud, after being directed to answer by 
the court, defendant stated that he did not recall. The second 
question, which referred to the night of the murder, was, "Did 
you go down to the La Jolla Park~'' and, upon the court's 
direction, defendant replied, ''I think I did.'' The record 
also shows, however, that, in response to a number of ques-
tions relating to the details of his sexual misconduct, de~ 
fendant answered that he did not remember. The comment 
of the judge, therefore, was correct with respect to the general 
types of questions as to which defendant testified he could not 
remember. It was inaccurate as to which questions de-
fendant at first refused to answer and was then directed to 
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answer, but this constitutes no more than a minor inaceuracy 
which could not have prejudiced defendant. 
[10] 'I'henc was no error in the comJHent, ''It is up to you 
to determine whether he sho1ved any remorse or whether he 
has told you everything from the witness stand that he knew." 
It was preceded by the direetion that the ''may con-
t;ider" whether dcfC'nc1ant had any remorse and was followed 
by the remark that "J'OU may take all those things into con-
sideration.'' These are correct statements of the in aecord 
with the principles discussed in People v. Friend, 47 Cal.2d 
74!J [306 P.2d 463]. 'rhe jury was thus informed that tlH•se 
matters could properly be considered; it was not told that a 
determination of them, one way or the other, ·was required in 
order to seleet the penalty; and, as stated above, the court 
subsequently instrueted that a finding of either mitigating or 
aggravating circumstances was not necessary in choosing be-
tween death or life imprisonment as the punishment. 
[11] It is not trur•, as asserted by defendant, that the 
comments were limited to evidence which >vas unfavorable to 
him. The judge pointed out that defendant had made a con-
fession, that he had undergone the orchidectomy, that the 
jury could consider his history after the operation, and that 
it did not appear that he had been in any serious trouble since 
then. It may also be noted that the judge did not comment on 
some evidence whieh was very unfavorable to defendant. For 
example, no rel'erence was made to the testimony of defend-
ant's sister-in-law or to the extremely damaging inferenee 
permitted by it. [6b] Moreover, even if the commeuts as a 
whole are regarded as placing the greater stress on matters 
adverse to defendant, it is settled, as we have seen, that a 
judge need not sum up all the evidence, both favorable and 
unfavorable. 
The juflge at no time expressed an opinion as to the penalty 
whieh should he impo,;ed, and none of his stat0ments could 
be reasonably regardrd as contentious to a. degree amounting 
to partisan advocacy. He not only mentioned fa.rtors favor-
able to defendant and pointed out that the jury could consider 
them but, in addition, expressed his views with respect to 
adverse considerations in temperate language. Final1y, it 
should again h2 rmphasized that he made clear that the com-
ments were advisory only and that the question of penalty 
was entirely within the absolute disrretion of the jury. 
Under the circumstances, to hold that the judge's comments 
warrant a reversal would require a determination that a 
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judge has a lesser right to comment on evidence relating to 
punishment than on evidence affecting guilt, and, as previously 
discussed, no such distinction can be made without ignoring 
the authorization contained in section 19 of article VI of the 
Constitution. With the exception of the minor inaccuracy 
noted above, which could not have been harmful, the comments 
of the judge were in keeping with the Constitution and the 
established limitations on his power, and there is no sound 
basis for concluding that the question of penalty was not 
fairly tried. 
The judgment and the order denying a new trial are af-
firmed. 
Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-It is my view that the trial 
judge's comments to the jury in the case at bar go far afield 
from the court's proper function, exceed the court's power to 
''make such comment on the evidence and the testimonv and 
credibility of any witness as in its opinion is necessa;y for 
the proper determination of the case" (Cal. Const., art. VI, 
§ 19) as that power relates to the selection of penalty for first 
degree murcler, and invade a province which by law is solely 
that of the jury. 
The most serious departure by the trial judge (and by the 
majority) from the law as spelled out in our previous deci-
sions (see People v. Friend (1957), 47 Cal.2d 749, 766 [13] 
[306 P.2d 463]; People v. Green (1956), 47 Cal.2d 209, 218-
232 [7-10] [302 P.2d 307]; see also People v. Hall (1926), 199 
Cal. 451, 456-458 [249 P. 859]; People v. Bollinger (1925), 
196 Cal. 191, 207 [237 P. 25]; People v. Le.ary (1895), 105 
Cal. 486, 496 [39 P. 24]) is that here the trial judge made 
unmistakably clear to the jury the fact that in his opinion they 
should fix the punishment at death. The majority purport to 
meet this issue by holding that ''The extent to which a judge 
is free to comment on the evidence is shown by the fact that 
it has frequently been recognized that a judge may express 
his opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant ... 
There is no justification for holding that a judge has a lesser 
right to comment on the evidence where punishment is in-
volved than where matters relating to guilt are in issue, and 
the same principles should be applied in determining whether 
the power has been properly exercised.'' Contrary to the 
majority's quoted declaration, there is justification-indeed, 
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not only justification but necessity, if we are to abide by the 
law previously enunciated-for holding that ''a judge has a 
lesser right to comment on the evidence where punishment is 
involved than where matters relating to guilt are in issue." 
The difference is an obvious one. Guilt must always depend 
on evidence and only on and the judge may comment 
on evidence hence, he may indicate an opinion as to the fact 
which depends on evidence. But where punishment (in a 
first degree murder case) is involved the selection of the 
penalty need not depend in any degree whatsoever on the 
evidence and, under the legislative plan as we have construed 
it, must always include exercise of an "absolute" or unfet-
tered discretion. 
As we unqualifiedly enunciated in People v. Friend (1957), 
supra, 47 CaL2d 749, 764-765 [11], the discretion of the jury 
as to pcualty in a first degree murder case is absolute1 and 
may be resolved on considerations of pure con,jecture, sym-
pathy, apprehension, etc.; it is the law (pp. 767-768 of 47 
CaL2d) "that insofar as selecting the penalty is concerned 
(as between the two alternatives [of life imprisonment or 
death)) the law does not itself prescribe, nor authorize the 
court to innovate, any rule circumscribing the exercise of 
1 This holding was by no means new to the law. In People v. Green 
(1956), supra, 47 Cal.2d 209, 218 [5], we declared: "There has never 
been any suggestion or intimation within the language of the statute 
since its 1874 amendment [sectwn 1!10 of the Penal Code as amended in 
1874 provided that "Every person guilty of murder in the first degree 
shall suffer death or confinement in the state prison for life, at the dis-
cretion of the jury trying the same ... ''] that the discretion of the jury 
was conditional on, or had to be guided by, any particular circumstances 
... " (See also id., pp. 218-219 L7J of 47 Cal.2d.) And in People v. 
Bollinger ( 1925), s11pra, 196 CaL 191, 207, on the authority of People v. 
Leary (1895), supra, 103 Cal. 486, we held; "It is clear beyond question 
that by the language of the amended seetion fPen. Code, ~ 190, as 
amended by Stats. 1873-1874, p. 457] ... two changes were made in the 
law as to the punishment for murder in the first degree-first, that the 
punishment may be either d<'ath or life imprisonment; and, second, that 
the discretion of determining which punishment shall be imposed was 
vested in the jury alone. For ... the law places no restriction upon the 
jury's exercise of such discretion, nor does it attempt to confine its 
exercise to cases presenting palliating or mitigating circumstances .... 
The legislatnre has 'confided the power to affix the punishment within 
these two alternatives to the absolute discretion of the jury .... ' (People 
v. Leary [189::;, supra], 103 CaL 4ilo, 496 [39 P. 24].)" And as we stated 
in the Green case (pp. 22:1-23G of 47 Cal.2d), "The above quotation from 
the Hall case (199 Cal. 4:)1, 4:iG-4.38) [the quotation from the Hall case 
appears at pp. 224-23:) of tho Green rase], together with that portion of 
the Bollinger cnse (196 CaL 191, 207) which quotes section 190 of the 
Penni Code (as amcnc1ed in 1873-1874) with the declaration that its mean-
ing is 'clear beyond question,' correctly states the law; the decision 
we make today at last requires compliance with that law.'' 
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their discretion, but, rather, commits the <whole matter of its 
exercise to the judgment and the consciences of the jury; that 
in deciding the question <whether the accused should be put to 
death or sentenced to imprisonment for life it is within their 
discretion alone to determine, each for himself, how far he will 
accord to the considerations of the several objectives 
of punishment, of the deterrence of crime, of the protection of 
society, of the desirability of stern retribution, or of sympathy 
or clemency, of age, sex, human passion, or weak-
ness, or (if appropriate under the evidence, of illness or 
intoxication or provocation not sufficient to reduce the degree 
or class of the crime), of the presumptions concerning, or 
possible uncertainties attaching to, life imprisonment, or of 
the irrevocableness of an executed sentence of death, or an 
apprehension that explanatory facts may exist which have not 
been brought to light, or any other consideration whatever 
which in the light of the evidence, the duty they owe to the 
accused and to the state, and the law as explained to them 
by the judge, appears to them to be important.'' 
Although the trial judge gave lip service to the rule that 
"the penalty is entirely up to you [the jury]," and "any-
thing I say is not binding on you," his comments as a whole, 
even if they were an accurate review of such of the evidence 
as he commented upon, would constitute a partisan plea for 
the more extreme penalty. The judge not only indicated in 
a general way his view that the penalty should be death; he 
went on to particularize his reasons for his view. He made it 
clear that in his opinion defendant showed no remorse ("I 
seemed to feel as I heard it that Mr. Friend was concerned 
mostly about his own plight and not what he had done") 
and that defendant had not fully disclosed details of the 
crime known to him ("He was the only one ... that could 
give you the full details, if he saw fit so to do, but he said 
he didn't remember much about the rape, didn't remember 
much about this or about that"). Furthermore, in giving 
his reasons, the trial judge did not merely comment on the 
evidence; he misstated evidence unfavorably to defendant. 
The judge said, ''Yon saw the defendant on the witness stand 
on two different occasions when he wouldn't answer the ques-
tions on cross-examination .... \Vhcn certain questions were 
asked him why he didn't want to answer them. \Vhen I 
orderrd him to answer them he said, 'I don't rrmembcr,' or 
'I don't know.' Those were questions relative to the rape and 
relative to the molesting of the minor children several years 
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later and the rape on the elderly woman on which he was on 
probation at the time he was picked up for this offense." 
The two questions ·which defendant did not answer tlirectly, 
and ·which the judge directed him to answt'r, bad nothing to 
do with rape or molestation of children. One of the inc-id<:>nts 
which resulted in the judge's defendant to answer 
on cross-examination was as follows: 
'' Q. Did you have a couple of suitcas<:'s there [at defendant's 
brother's house ·when defendant called the newspaper re-
porter] ? A. Yes. 
"Q. \\There were they in the house? A. I can't say where. 
That makes no difference. They were in the house. 
''THE CouRT: Answer the question. 
''A. \Vell, I don't recall now just exactly where they were 
in the house.'' 
The second incident whieh resulted in the judge's direeting 
defendant to answer on cross-examination was as follows: 
"Q. Did you go down to the La Jolla Park [on the night 
defendant killed Miss Muir] 1 A. I think at this time, I think 
the story has been told so clog-gonned many times I am getting 
tir<?d of repeating the thing. 
''THE CouRT: Mr. Friend, you will answer the questions. 
You have given your story on direet and you will give it on 
crOSfl. Now you answer the questions. 
'' Bv MR. I1ow: Q. Did you go down to the La Jolla Parl• 2 
A. I think I did." 
Manifestly these two ineidents did not involve matters as 
serious as those indieated in the trial judge's eomments; they 
did not concern defendant's offenses of rape and molestation 
of minor ehildren. The judge's statement that defendant re-
fused to answer questions about those important and dam-
aging matters was seriously prejudieial to defendant. 
On the prior appeal in this case (People v. Friend (1957), 
supra, 47 Cal.2d 749) we took cognizance of the sole and 
absolute disc'retion of the jury in the seleetion between the 
two alternative but equally prescrilwd punishments, and for 
the guidance and assi:-:tancc of trial judges speeifiea 1ly pointed 
out that (p. 766 of 47 Cal.2d) "[13] Quite naturally jurors, 
in the conscientious dischargr of their dnty, are eager, as were 
those in this ease, to have all the guidanee the law ean give 
them. This poses a delicate task for the trial judge but his 
duty is elear. He must, of course, inform the jurors that they 
have no coneern with punishment unless, under the instruc-
tions applicable to the trial of the issue of guilty or not guilty, 
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shall have found that all reasonable doubt the 
defendant is guilty of murder of the first degree as charged.r 2l 
When and if they so find, the duty of selecting the penalty 
devolves upon them, and on them alone, and they should be 
instructed as to the absolute nature of their power in the 
exercise of that function. 
"From the discussion of the subject hereinabove and in 
v. Green (1956), 47 Cai.2d] 209, 217-221, 229-
232, it appears that there need· be no error in counsel's 
advancing arguments as to which penalty will better serve 
the objectives of punishment, or in contending that the effect 
of certain evidence is 'mitigating' or 'aggravating,' as may 
affect their selection of the punishment to be imposed, provided 
that the jurors in every case are clearly and adequately in-
str1teted as to the fttll scope of their function. They should 
be told (in accord with the law as reviewed in People v. Green 
( 1956), supra, and herein) that beyond prescribing the two 
alternative penalties the law itself provides no standard for 
their guidance in the selection of the punishment; that the law 
provides equally the two penalties of death or life imprison-
ment, but that neither penalty attaches automatically or at 
all until the jury unanimously agree upon their choice of 
punishment and designate it in their verdict; that the choice 
as between the two penalties is in every case committed to their 
absolute discretion." (Italics added.) 
Section 190 of the Penal Code ''clearly and equally states 
two alternatives as punishment; it gives preference to 
neither." (People v. Green ( 1956), Sttpra, 47 Cal.2d 209, 
218 [7]; People v. Friend (1957), supra, 47 CaL2d 749, 751 
[5a]; People v. Brust (1957), 47 Cal.2d 776, 787 [9] [306 
P.2d 480].) Since the law itself suggests no preference for 
penalty or basis for making the selection, neither should the 
trial judge, by comment to the jury, suggest preference for 
either penalty or emphasize factors which would tend to in-
fluence the jury toward either penalty. Selection of penalty, 
as we have repeatedly emphasized, is exclusively and abso-
lutely the province of the jury. Presumptively, a suggestion 
that the death penalty should not be imposed would not be 
prejudicial to the defendant, but certainly any suggestion that 
it should be imposed would be inherently prejudicial. 
As to comment on the evidence relating to the issue of guilt 
•since the 1957 enactment of section 190.1 of the Penal Code, the 
issue of punishment is separately tried if a person is found guilty of 
an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death. 
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or innocence it is said in People v. Robinson (1946), 
73 Cal.App.2d 237 [166 P.2d 17], that "The right thus 
conferred to comment on the eYidence is a most potent one. 
to eommE'nt, if thE'y do so, 
E'areful to exE'reise the power with 
wisdom and restraint. The point need not be labored that 
the members of the are apt to great to any 
hint from the as to his opinion on the weight of the 
evidence or the credibility of the witnesses, and, for that 
reason, care slJOu1d be taken not to affect unfairly the rights 
of the defendant." And comment on the evidence relating 
to the selection of penalty as hereinabove indicated, a far 
more delicate matter t11an comment on the facts bearing on 
the issue of guilt or innocence. On the issue of penalty, 
where so many factors, including extra}udicial factors, may 
properly influence-indeed, alone control-the jury's verdict, 
comment should be strictly restrained to the scope, nature, and 
substance we so carefully enunciated in the Green, Brust, and 
earlier Friend decisions; it should never extend to or encom-
pass any indication by the judge that in his opinion the death 
penalty should be selected. Such an indication is inherently 
an invasion of the :field which by law is committed exclusively 
and absolutely to the jury, and is clearly prejudicial to the 
defendant. Comment which passes the limit of fairness and 
amounts to advocacy of the more severe penalty is indis-
putably in contravention of our studird holdings in the Green, 
Brust, and previous Friend cases as well as of the long 
established rulings of this court in surh cases as People v. 
Leary (1895), supra, 105 Cal. 486, 493, and People v. Bol-
linger (1925), supra, 196 Cal. 191, 207. If we are so soon 
to depart from such certainty and clarity as the Green, Brust, 
and Friend holdings provided and arc to again indulge at least 
in part the inconsistencies which had plagued us for so many 
years (from 1874 to 1956; see People v. Green (1956), supra, 
47 Cal.2d 209, 218-232) we owe it to the bench and bar to 
specify those holdings which today are intended to be over-
ruled. 
Simple intellectual integrity requires us to recall now the 
miserable mass and mess of irreconcilable inconsistencies which 
had been growing from (on the one side) the gross errors of 
People v. Welch (1874), 49 Cal. 174, clear down through 
J{olez (1944), 23 Ca1.2d 670 [145 P.2d 580], Williams (J948), 
32 Ca1.2d 78 [195 P.2d 393], and Byrcl (1954), 42 Cal.2d 200 
[266 P.2d 505], and (on the other side) the never heretofore 
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disputed correctness of the 'It is clear beyond question" 
holdings of Leary (1895), 105 Cal. 486, 496 [39 P. 24], 
Bollinger (1925), 196 Cal. 191, 207 [237 P. 25], and Hall 
(1926), 199 Cal. 451, 456-458 [249 P. 859], and many other 
cases down to Green wherein p. 226 of 47 Cal.2d) we 
accepted the law which for so many years had been "clt>ar 
beyond question'' and declared that ''the decision we make 
today at last requires compliance with that law." But this 
is another "today," some two years later than Green. And 
on this "today" the majority implicitly and essentially recant 
the brave declaration of two years ago. As of today the law 
that from 1895 to 1956 was "clear beyond question" is either 
no longer the law or it is no longer clear. Furthermore, 
the decision today tells the bench and the bar that we no 
longer require "compliance with that law"; no longer is the 
discretion of the jury in the s<'lection of penalty absolute or 
unfettered; no longer is the selection of penalty exclusively 
the province of the jury. Rather, the majority today hold, 
even though the selection of penalty (as between the two 
equally prescribed), unlike the issue of guilt, is not a matter 
which must be resolved on or controlled by the evidence, that 
nevertheless the judge may not only comment on the evidence 
but may intimate that it does not warrant selection of life 
imprisonment in preference to death; and even though it is 
(or was) altogether clear that the jury alone has the function 
of selecting the penalty, the judge may tell them that in his 
opinion they should fix the penalty at death. 
The above indicated changes in the law which are express or 
implicit in today's majority decision impel me to reiterate 
some of the principles which, although apparently no longer 
the law, are, I think, deserving of respect. 
A jury of laymen confronted with the difficult task of 
selecting between the penalty of death and that of life im-
prisonment will, it may be assumed, look to the trial judge for 
such guidance as he may give them, and will be likely to take 
their cue from any intimation of the trial judge as to what 
verdict he believes they should return. Instead of attempt-
ing to influence the jurors to accept his view the trial judge 
should inform them in accord with the law stated in People 
v. Friend (1957), supra, 47 Cal.2d 749, 767, "that beyond 
prescribing the two alternative penalties the law itself provides 
no standard for their guidance in the selection of the punish-
ment; that the law provides equally the two penalties of 
death or life imprisonment, but that neither penalty attaches 
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automatically or at all until the jury unanimously agree upon 
their choice of punishment and designate it in their verdict; 
that the choice as between the two penalties is in every case 
eommitted to their absolute discretion," etc. It would be a 
rare case, if any, in which it would be proper for a trial judge 
to make any other comment on the law or the facts pertaining 
to the selection of penalty than comment of the scope and sub-
stance of that set forth in the Friend ease, supra, pagrs 766-
768 of 47 Cal.2d, and quoted in large part pages 509. 51:3. 
It is improper for the trial judge to throw the weight of 
his office behind a selection which is for the jury alone. "It 
is obvious that under any system of jury trials the influence 
of the trial judge on the jury is neeessarily and properly oE 
great weight, and that his lightest word or intimation is re-
eeived with deference, and may prove controlling." (Starr 
v. United States (1894), 153 U.S. 614, 626 [14 S.Ct. 919, 38 
L.Ed. 841], quoted in Bollenbach v. United States (1946), 
326 U.S. 607, 612 [66 S.Ct. 402, 90 L.Ed. 3501, and in 
Sanm~inetti v. JJloorc Dry Dock Co. ( 19;)1), 36 Cal.2d 812. 819 
[228 P .2d 557].) In the Sanguinetti case', an action for dam-
ages under the Jones Aet, plaintiff's counsel in the presence 
of the jury asked leave to amend the comp1aint to increase 
the amount of damages prayed for from $50,000 to $75.000. 
The trial court, outside the prrsence of the jnry, granted the 
motion and denied defendant's motion for mistrial on the 
ground of misconduct of plaintiff's counsel in presenting the 
motion in the jury's presence. 'fhe court instructed the jury 
that "The damages must be reasonable and cannot be in t'X-
cess of the amount alleged in the complaint, namt'1y $75.000." 
We held (p. 819 [3] of 36 CaL2d) that " ... any practice 
whieh would inelude the making of a motion, in the presence 
of the jury, after production of evidenet', to inc-rease the 
amount of damagcs askcd, and which would bring to the 
knowledge of the jury the fact that the conrt after hearing 
plaintiff's evidence permitted the eomplaint to be amended 
by inereasing the prayer for damagcs, shonld he nnht'sitantly 
eondemned and strieken down." for (p. 819 [ 4] of 3G Ca1.2({) 
"It is, of course, elementary tlmt the amount of dama~0s is 
ordinarily a question of fact to be determined hv the jnry." 
It is true that the Sanguinrtti case was bv a bare majority 
of this court but I do not understanr1 thnt the drrlarcd 
principles of law, as such. were srrions1y disnutecl. It was, 
rather, applieation of those princinles to the faets of the rase 
on which ~we divided. In the speeifie criminal case now before 
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us, it seems to me that the court's as to 
selection a matter committed to the sole and abso-
lute discretion of the , much more than its influencing 
the jury in any civil case as to amount of should be 
unhesitantly condemned and strickrn down. 
Also analogous are the statements in Dorsey v. 
Barba , 38 Cal.2d 350 P .2d 604], which holds that 
the trial court docs not have the power to increase an in-
adequate award of unliquidated damages without plaintiffs' 
consent: (p. 356 of 38 Cal.2d) "An essential element 
[of the constitutionally guaranteed right to trial by jury] 
. . . is that issues of fact shall be decided by a jury, and the 
assessment of damages is ordinarily a question of fact. The 
jury as a fact-finding body occupies so firm and important 
a place in our system of jurisprudence that any interference 
with its function in this respect must be examined with the 
utmost care"; (p. 358 [10] of 38 Cal.2d) "it is not the 
mere form of a jury trial to which one is entitled under the 
Constitution, but the fundamental right to have a jury de-
termination of fact." IJikewise it is not the mere form of a 
jury selection of penalty to which a defendant is entitled 
under the Penal Code, but the fundamental right to have the 
selection made by the jury uninfluenced by the trial court. 
It seems particularly incongruous, in my sense of relative 
values, that this court should reach the result of the majority 
in this case when so recently the court in considering a claim 
for damages in a civil case held that there must be a new trial 
because a jury may have been "misled [by statements of the 
trial judge] as to the proper manner of determining liability." 
In Butir;an v. Yellow Cab Co. (1958), 49 Cal.2d 652, 660 [320 
P.2d 500], this court (even though the Vchicle Code expressly 
recognizes unavoidable accident as a defense in the circum-
stances there defined, and even though the instruction had 
been recognized as proper for many years) held that through 
the giving of the instruction on unavoidable accident the 
jurors "may get the impr0ssion that unavoidability is an issue 
to be decided and that, if proved, it constitutes a separate 
ground of nonliability of the d0fendant. Thus they may be 
misled as to the proper manner of d0termining liability ... " 
How much more likely it is that the jury in this penalty-
and inherently damaging stat0m0nts of the trial judge. 
selection case were misled by the inaccurate, unwarranted, 
The fact that the defendant in thE' instant case is a miserable, 
friendless creature, guilty of horrible crimes, does not make 
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of our function, 
was the plaintiff in 
The cases last eitrod and summarized to situations 
other than now before us the familiar concept that 
tl1e trial should .interfere in matters 
whieh are for the cxelnsiv0 determination of th0 The 
Green (1956), supra, 47 Cal.2d and earlier Friend (,Jan-
uary , supra, 47 Cal.2d casrc; apply 
that eoneept to the selection of penalty. Since 
the latter deeisions since the return, on ,June 1957, of 
the influenced verdict now under consideration), 
the ru1e:s there announeed have received implic~it lc•gislative ap-
proval an enactment whieh went into effrct on September 
11, 1957, and which amended section 190 of the Prnal Code 
and adopted section lf/0.1 of that code so as to provide for a 
separate trial on the issue of pnnislmwnt in the case of a 
person c:harp:ed with an offense fer which the pena1ty is in the 
alternative death or life imprisonment, 
Section 190.1 provir1rs in part that "Evid0nce may be pre-
sented at the further proc-eedings on tl1e issne of penalty, of 
the circumstanc-es :surronw1ing the crime, of the defendant's 
background and history, and of: an~r facts in af('gravation or 
mitigation of the penalty." 'l'hns the seetion elearlv aecepts 
our suggrstion in the rarlier Priend opinion (p. 763 of 47 
Ca1.2d, footnote 7) that "The el1aractrr and seopc> of evidence 
pertinent to punishment which slwnld be reeeivcd in a case 
wherein tllC' jury is reqnirrc1 to fix the penalty, is a subject 
which could wrll recrivr leg-islativr attention." 
Section 190.1 fnrthrr proYidrs in material rart that "In 
any case in whieh c1efrndant l111s hrrn fonnr1 gnili~, by a jnry, 
and the same or anothrr jury, trying: the issne of penalt:l', is 
unable to reach a nnanimons verciirt on the issne of prnalty, 
the conrt shall dismiss the jnry and c•ilhrr impose thr punish-
ment for lifr in lien of ordering a new trial on the issne of 
penalty, or order a nrw impanrled to tnr the issue of 
penalty ... " The \Yorc!ing of this nrw sedinn rrrtainly 
does not pnrport to anthorize thr trial .imlcrr to "order a new 
jnry imnanrlrd to trY tlw issne of nrnaltv" and to {ngfnrct 
them tlwt in J;is shou/<1 thr at death. 
It dor.s authorize tlw trial jn(11.(l' to "eitlH•r imT'osr the rmnish-
mrnt for 1ifr . , . or order a nrw impaneled to try the 
issue of peualty." 
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There is not the indication in the new section 
that the Legislature intended to alter the rules spelled out by 
this court in Pcopl e v. Green ( 1956), supra, 47 Cal.2d 209, 
and People v. F1·iencl (1957), supra, 47 Ca1.2d 749. The sec-
tion does not empower the to instruct the jury in any 
way whatsoever not consonant with those rules. Rather, by 
dealing with the matters there determined in a manner con-
sistent with those determinations it in effect rerognizes and 
approves our holdings. Today the majority not only refuse to 
recognize and apply those holdings; further refuse to 
accept the legislative reco<.;nition of such holdings. 
For the rC'asons above statC'cl I would reverse the judgment 
and the order denying a new trial. 
McComb, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I am in full accord with the vic'lvs expressed by Mr. ,Tustice 
Schauer in his dissenting opinion in this case. The quoted 
statements of the trial jndge to the jury were obviously in-
tended to and did influence the jury in the rendition of its 
verdict. The unmistakable effect of these statrments was to 
deny defendant the free, untrammeled and unbiased determi-
nation of the jury as to punishnwnt to which defenc1ant was 
entitled under the law of this state. As forcibly pointed out 
in said dissenting opillion, the majority of tbis court has re-
versed judgments based upon jury verdicts in civil cases where 
the alleged error was infinitesimal compared to that shown 
by the record in this case. 'l'his is particularly true where 
the a11rged error consisted of commrnts or statements of the 
trial judge which may have affected the determination reached 
hy the jury. 
In Sanquinctti v. Moore Dry Dock Co., 36 Ca1.2d 812 [228 
P.2d 557], I could see no error, mnch less prejudicial mis-
condnrt, on the part of either the trial judge or counsel for 
plaintiff which in any manner influenced the verdict in that 
ease (see my dissent, p. 828 et SE'q.), but a majority of this 
eourt nevC'rthrless reversed a judgm0nt for plaintiff which was 
ohvionsly surmorted by substantial evidence bC'canse plaintiff's 
C'onns0l. in the presence of the jury, moved to amend the 
prfl~·er of plaintiff's complflint hy increasing the demand for 
damflgPs from $50,000 to $75,000. The court did not rule on 
tl1is motion in the presence of the jury, but later granted 
it and instructed the jury that it could not return a verdict in 
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excess of tlle sum of the amount demamlrd 
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'rhc returned a verdict 
ma;jority of this court rcv<ersed a 
tJw sole ground that the 
and a 
enterrd thereon on 
I did not agree 
misconduet 
constitnted 
that its adverse effect npon the c:nmoi 
To my mind it is tmfortnnate 
in a criminal ease is upheld in the faee of ohvions and 
misconduct on the 11art of a trial or prose-
cuting attorney ·with the 's approval, as sneh a situation 
casts gran doubt upon the fairness of the trial anrl may 
amount to a violation of the due process elnnses of both the 
state and federal Constitutions. Snch ·was the sitnation in 
the recent case of People v. p. T5 P.2d 
397] dissenting opinion, p. 106), where the same 
trial judge presided as in the case at bar. 
It is my considered opinion that the administration of 
tive is defeated in many cases wl1ere a trial jni!ge throws the 
weight of his position against a litigant by eoll(lnet or state-
ments designed to influence the jury agaimt sur·h litigant. 
'\Vhilc jurors do not always respond to snch conrlnr·t, there 
is a temlency for thrm to flo so, ·whir·h has tllr rffrrt of de-
priving the litigant of his right to a fair trial before a jury. 
Unless this eonrt assumes thr~ hnnlrn of eorrceting- sitnatiom; 
of this character when called to its attention, we might just 
as well abolish our jury s~rstem. 
I would reverse the jndg-mrnt impo"ing the (Jroaih penalty 
and grant defendant a new trial on the issue of punishment. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing- >nls d0nied .Jnlv 30, 
1958. Carter, .J., St'haurr, ,T., and l\feComh, ,J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
